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Abstract: 
The transition towards a low carbon energy system requires significant deployment of renewable energy 
technologies. Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) plants could contribute to a low carbon energy system, with an 
estimated potential global capacity of over 600 GW by 2030. Despite this potential, however, the CSP industry 
lags behind other renewable technologies, with only about 4% of its estimated global potential expected to be 
realised in the next decade. This paper investigates the reasons for this by comparing CSP in the US, where 60% 
of worldwide capacity is currently located, with South Africa, where its development has been slow despite an 
abundance of natural solar-energy resources. Using strategic niche management analysis, we identify replicable 
success factors that could accelerate the uptake of CSP projects in developing countries. The results reveal that 
the main reason for the successful diffusion and adoption of CSP in the US is consistent policy support, which 
has  made it possible to bridge the gap between research and development and emerge in the market. By contrast, 
the development of CSP in South Africa has been hindered by several technical and economic problems, including 
a lack of technological expertise, resources and funding.  
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Despite consistent growth in the renewable energy market, current carbon emission targets are 
unlikely to be achieved globally. According to the IEA [1] , to achieve the goal of limiting 
global warming to 2°C, low-carbon energy must replace approximately 850 GW of electricity 
currently generated by coal-fired power stations.  
In 2015, developing countries accounted for 63% of global greenhouse emissions [2] and this 
percentage is increasing [3,4]. South Africa is one of the biggest sources, being responsible for 
40% of emissions in sub-Saharan Africa [4–6]. The country relies on coal-fired generation for 
around 68% of its total primary energy supply [7]. 
One technology that could contribute significantly to a low carbon future is Concentrated Solar 
Power (CSP). CSP plants can store thermal energy, which means they can supply electricity 
after sunset or when the weather is cloudy,  making solar generation more reliable [8]. Utility-
scale CSP plants were first installed in the US, in California, between 1984 and 1991, where 
they have proven to be a reliable contributor to the Californian grid [9].  
CSP applications have grown more slowly than other types of renewable energy. One reason 
for this is that CSP projects require sites with high insolation, ideally direct sunshine of over 
1900 kWh/m2 per year. This requirement restricts CSP’s potential deployment in 
Mediterranean regions like Spain, southern Italy, southern France, Greece, Cyprus and Malta 
[10,11]. However, opportunities abound for the development of CSP in sunnier regions, such 
as in the Sun Belt region of the southern US, and in many developing countries in the Middle 
East, Central and South America, Africa and South Asia. In some of these locations, annual 
solar irradiation can be as high as 2500 kWh/m2 [12,13]. In some parts of South Africa the 





has an annual direct normal irradiance (DNI) of 2800 kWh/m2 [14], one of the highest in the 
world. If South Africa fully exploited its solar resource, it could accommodate over 500 GW 
of CSP projects [15]. But despite this remarkable potential, the entire country currently has 
only 500 MW of operational CSP plant [16]. 
Worldwide, most CSP projects are in the US (60%, mainly in California) and Spain (27%) [8]. 
The most commonly cited reason for other countries being so slow to take advantage of CSP 
is the high capital cost involved [9,13,17]. Compared to other renewable technologies, 
constructing a CSP plant requires considerable investment, often a problem for a developing 
country like South Africa, where finance costs are high because of political and economic risk 
factors [10,12,17]. Schinko and Komendantova [18] note that the weighted capital cost of 
deploying a CSP project in an African country is more than double that in Europe. Trieb et al. 
[9] observe that importing low-cost power plants from developed countries and using subsidies 
from international institutions often does not sufficiently offset these costs and the associated 
risks to make a CSP project financially feasible for a developing country. They advise that 
successful diffusion of CSP requires a financial strategy that can compensate for the political 
and economic risks of the particular region.  
Other obstacles besides finance may limit the uptake of this technology [17]. Mahia et al. [19] 
say that policy-related barriers and a lack of government support in developing countries, 
particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, are more critical than economic constraints. 
Opazo [20] says problems like a lack of technological expertise, insufficient resources, and 
limited involvement by industrial actors hinder the development of innovative technologies in 
developing countries, and Elmustapha et al.[21] say poor investment in research and 





Most published analysis of the slow development of CSP in developing countries has 
investigated these economic, political and technical barriers to uptake, but a more rigorous and 
systematic approach is now needed. This paper uses a strategic niche management (SNM) 
approach to investigate the diffusion and development of CSP projects. The SNM framework 
was developed by Kemp et al. [22] to analyse the way that technological change and its social 
acceptance evolve together. SNM, as a research method, can help to investigate how a new 
technology has been successfully introduced in the past, and to determine the required 
conditions for successful diffusion and development of radical innovations in the future. A few 
researchers have already applied it to the emergence of alternative energy technology in 
developing countries [21,23]. We used SNM framework to investigate the faltering progress of 
CSP projects in South Africa as compared with their successful implementation in California. 
We wanted to know whether SNM helps to explain the marked difference between CSP 
development in South Africa and in the US, and whether any lessons from the successful 
introduction of CSP in the US could be transferred to a country like South Africa. 
To find the answers, we first identified institutional, social and techno-economic obstacles that 
have restricted the development of CSP projects and used the SNM framework to evaluate and 
compare the development of CSP niches in the US and South Africa. We then considered what 
lessons might be transferrable, to accelerate the uptake of CSP in South Africa and other 
developing countries. 
 Section 2 reviews the literature on the CSP industry and identifies the barriers to its 
development, Section 3 explains the  SNM framework, Section 4 describes our data collection 





2. Overview of the development of CSP niches 
Figure 1 illustrates the four CSP technologies that are currently in use around the world: Linear 
Fresnel Reflector (LFR), Solar power tower, Stirling parabolic dish, and Parabolic Trough 
Collector (PTC), All of these four CSP typologies, regardless of the type of their technology, 
contain three main components: a solar field, a power block and storage [8].  
 
 
Figure 1: Different types of CSP technologies [24] 
The parabolic trough collector, first demonstrated in Egypt in 1913, is currently used in 81% 
of operational CSP plants and in many more that are under construction [24,25].  
A prototype of the Stirling parabolic dish system was successfully built in southern California 
between 1982 and 1985, but today most are being used only for demonstration purposes rather 
than commercial energy generation [25,26].  
The solar power tower was demonstrated for the first time in Sicily in 1965 in a project called 
EURELIOS. The first fully scaled-up commercial tower was the Planta Solar 10, built 40 years 
later in Andalusia, Spain [8,27]. The time lag between the initial research and the commercial 
exploitation of this heliostatic tower model might suggest some early doubts about its viability. 





installed capacity of solar power towers reached 14% of total global CSP generation (460MW) 
and once those currently under construction are in operation, this will rise to 28% [24]. 
A prototype LFR was built and demonstrated in Genoa, Italy, in 1964, but its commercial 
development has been slow. Currently there are only 15 commercial plants of this type 
worldwide and only six of them are operational [8,25].  
Globally, installed CSP capacity has risen from 355 MW in 2005 to 5.5 GW in 2018 [8,28], an 
average annual growth of 400 to 500 MW. The CSP industry added around 601 MW in 2018 
with projects becoming operational in Morocco, South Africa, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and some 
others, but the growth rate is not accelerating noticeably [29]. Optimistic forecasts assume a 1 
to 1.5 GW annual growth, and would bring global capacity to 22.4 GW by 2030. But this comes 
nowhere near the full potential for CSP capacity by that date, which is conservatively estimated 
to be over 600 GW [29].  
It is clear that, despite a few positive signs, the development of the CSP industry has been and 
continues to be slow. This is especially the case when one compares CSP to other renewable 
energy technologies, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) generation (currently at 123 GW global 
capacity) and wind-turbine generation (currently at 435 GW global capacity) [8,9,29,30].  
Several researchers have sought to identify the reasons for this sluggish progress and the rest 
of this section discusses the various types of barriers they have identified. 
2.1 Main market barriers  
The literature reveals several barriers that may be slowing down the worldwide 
commercialisation of CSP: high initial capital costs, financial and technical risks, extensive 





lethargy, regulatory obstacles, social opposition and cheaper competition [1,10,11,31]. These 
barriers are discussed below, together with some ways they could be overcome [1,10,11,31].  
2.1.1 Techno-economic barriers  
The high capital cost of CSP is a major obstacle to its commercial development. Solar PV 
projects, for instance, have proven more attractive to investors because they offer better 
economic returns [32]. Even though the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) generated by CSP 
appears to be decreasing, it is still likely to remain higher than that generated by fossil fuels 
and some other forms of renewable energy [11,13,32,33]. High capacity factors and total 
installed costs are both driving for the cost reduction of the CSP projects as well as LCOE. The 
global installed costs of CSP are decreasing each year. The global weighted average of LCOE 
of CSP in 2018 was 0.185/kWh which was 26% lower than in 2017 and 46% lower than in 
2010 [34] (Figure 2).  
At the same time, however, the global average capacity factor increased from 39% in 2017 to 
45% in 2018. Technical advances could hugely improve the economic performance of CSP 
plants [35]. For example, the use of molten salts instead of thermal oils as the heat transfer 
fluid [31] has improved their thermal efficiency [8].  Alsagri et al. [36] have suggested that 
integrating molten-salt thermal energy storage into a CSP plant could reduce its LCOE by as 






Figure 2: Global average total installed cost, capacity factor and for CSP projects from 2010 to 2018 [34] 
Labordena et al. [17] argue that one of the main reasons for the high capital cost of CSP projects 
is that they can only be located in areas with very high solar irradiation. In practice, many CSP 
plants are in deserts with little industrial infrastructure, thus often needing long power lines to 
connect them to the grid. This makes CSP much more complex to implement than renewable 
energy systems that can be located close to towns and cities. However, Trieb et al. [9] point 
out that high voltage power lines are a cost-effective way of transmitting energy, and they note 
that offshore wind farms are also generally located far from towns and cities yet are a 
commercial success. 
Another site-specific technical challenge which some have argued holds up the large-scale 
deployment of CSP is lack of available water for cooling the machinery that produces the 
electricity from the stored heat [1]. Dry-cooling technology is one solution, but it is much more 





Another site-related problem that could hold up CSP development is the large area of flat land 
needed for the mirror field that harvests the solar irradiation. The area needed depends on the 
plant’s capacity, type of CSP technology, solar field and thermal storage size [12]. A CSP plant 
requires 20,234 m2 per megawatt of electricity produced [31,37,38] and land with an average 
gradient of between 1% and 3%; with 1% being preferable as any steeper gradient up to 3% 
will increase the cost of construction [12]. 
Khan and Arsalan [32] suggest that one of the main reasons for the prohibitive cost of CSP 
installation is that the technology has remained stuck for an unusually long time at the 
beginning of its learning curve. This prolonged immaturity has delayed the achievement of the 
normally expected economies of scale when prototypes are developed into larger plants. Del 
Río & Kiefer [10] observe that the high cost of CSP technology in the earlier years of its 
development (2008-2012) was because uptake was almost entirely limited to Spain. However, 
looking to the future, they identify a rapidly emerging and dynamic CSP market in places like 
China, Chile and Morocco, with an expected cost reduction in coming years. 
2.1.2 Institutional and legal barriers 
According to Labordena et al. [17] that another major barrier to the adoption of renewables in 
developing countries, alongside, and to some extent exacerbating, the financial constraints, is 
institutional. Lack of political commitment to such large and expensive projects undermines 
their commercial feasibility. But there are many ways in which governments can signal their 
reliable support.  
For a start, governments can incentivise CSP projects by guaranteeing low-risk finance. The 
Spanish government provided low-risk finance for several years, helping to make CSP projects 





[39]. The Spanish government reversed this policy in 2013, resulting in uncertainty that led to 
a slowdown. By contrast, the Italian government has recently signalled its ongoing support for 
CSP plants by introducing a Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) to encourage them [13]. Overall, the main 
driver for CSP uptake is government subsidies, including FiT. 
In addition to financial risk  and legal and administrative barriers, such as difficulties in 
securing land and water rights, can limit the deployment of CSP plants. Del Río et al. [13] say 
one of the main problems in Italy and Greece is the over-complexity of the planning permission 
process. Italian environmental regulations also do not allow the use of oil in CSP plants, which 
limits the technological options.  
2.1.3 Social acceptance 
Among the environmental impacts of CSP plants that have led to social opposition [40], such 
as interference with land and agricultural usage, the most commonly cited are high water 
consumption and reduction of biodiversity [41–43]. During the construction of the Ouarzazate 
Solar Power Station in Morocco, or Noor 1, the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant, 
there were several protests over the diversion of water resources from nearby villages [43,44]. 
However, the literature indicates that the protests were not major, and according to Hanger et 
al.[45] 91% of the community in the region of the plant were strongly in favour of CSP projects.  
Visual intrusion is another common complaint made by the general public. Tower CSP plants 
are conspicuous features on the horizon. In contrast, PTC plants are much less obtrusive despite 
occupying large areas of land that cause changes to the landscape [46]. Given that these plants 
are usually in arid locations far from towns and cities, it can hardly be claimed that they 
represent a major eyesore [46]. More serious than visual intrusion is the risk to birds, from 





solar flux [40,41]. Collisions may occur when the structures are invisible or confusing to birds. 
According to Otieno and Loosen [41]  collisions with the parabolic trough plants are more 
likely to happen when birds mistake surface reflections for sky or water, and that burning from 
flux streams may be more frequent with tower plants [41]. However, both Otieno and Loosen 
[41] and Walston et al. [47] say the number of bird fatalities caused by CSP plants is not 
remarkable in comparison with other causes. 
Besides water consumption, visual intrusion and the threat to birds, land occupancy is another 
common cause of public opposition. As land may have religious, symbolic and cultural value 
for some communities, installing CSP plants without careful planning could lead to conflict 
[43,48]. In 2010, the Moroccan government’s purchase of 3,000 ha of collectively owned land 
for the development of Noor 1 caused several protests as the land had historical significance 
[49]. 
Wenzlawski and Tol [11], however, argue that most of the barriers to CSP progress are 
manageable or avoidable, so the question of why CSP is developing so slowly remains largely 
unanswered. 
3. Strategic niche management  
The transition to a low carbon energy system requires many changes, not just from the 
consumers’ side but also in government policies and technical approaches [21]. Radical 
innovations and sustainable technologies can be developed in specialised areas called ‘niches’ 
[22,50], which can stimulate systemic change [21,51]. Strategic niche management (SNM) is 
the process of managing niche formation through real-life experiments [52]. It can be a way of 
bridging the so-called ‘valley of death’ between research and development (R&D) and the 





SNM seeks to understand and to foster the socio-economic and technological process by which 
such transitions occur. It provides a theoretical framework for the successful introduction of 
innovations that are necessary to achieve long-term social objectives such as sustainability, but 
which require radical novelties which conflict with existing infrastructure, policy and practice 
[22,53,54].  
As a research tool for understanding transition, SNM looks back at the history of recent 
experiments in technological change to identify the conditions that foster or hinder the 
development of successful niches [52,53]. As a policy tool for fostering transition [53,54], it 
has been used to evaluate or encourage the introduction of new technology, such as solar energy 
in developing countries [21] and community-owned renewable energy projects in the UK [55]. 
However, it is not without its critics. Caniëls and Romijn [54] argue that although it has proven 
useful in analysing the outcomes of experiments in introducing renewable energy technologies, 
such as wind turbines biogas plants and electric vehicles, its track record as an authoritative 
guide to policy is less convincing. Elmustapha et al. [21] suggest that one reason for this may 
be that the success of niches depends on the local geography and culture, so SNM needs to 
sensitive to context.  
Kemp et al.[56] state three critical conditions that must be satisfied for a niche to be successful: 
expectations must be defined and voiced, supportive social networks must be built, and a 
learning process must occur. 
When SNM is applied to the introduction of renewable energy technology niches, supportive 
regulatory structures (such as subsidies) are very important because such niches can suffer from 
a high degree of instability and a lack of sufficient market demand [21]. The following 






Expectations play an important in promoting radical innovations with uncertain outcomes [57], 
particularly in the earliest phases of the technological innovation process [58]. The concept of 
expectations as the main element of technological innovation has been developed into the 
sociology of expectations by Borup et al.[57]. 
Sometimes consumers select a technology on the basis of facts, specifications of its practicality, 
and its economic variations. In the case of emerging innovative technologies, investment 
decisions have to be taken into consideration at an early stage of the development [58]. 
Technological innovations are most likely to be adopted and coordinated when consumers 
voice their expectations and receive a response. Adoption is likely when expectations are 
standard reference points for the actors at different levels of technology development [58,59].  
The voicing of positive expectations and an optimistic view of a new technology are crucial 
for successful niche development [60], especially in the case of radical innovations with 
uncertain outcomes. Expectations play an essential role in recruiting new actors and motivating 
them to learn [21,61,62], and they can also be used strategically to attract resources and funding 
[63]. Schot and Geels [53] believe they are most effective when they are shared by a large 
number of actors and are transparent and convincingly feasible and backed by experimental 
results.  
3.2 Social networks 
Social networks can play a vital role in niche formation and maintenance, by enabling actors 
to exchange views. Social networks can be built on both formal and informal platforms, 
including government organisations and conferences. They are most effective if they have a 





regulators. The livelier the interaction between them the better [21,64]. Opazo [20] notes that 
resources to support the platform must be available.  
3.3 Learning  
According to Schot & Geels [53], learning is essential because it enables changes in cognitive 
paradigms, leading the actors to adjust either the niche’s central technology or the social 
context in which the technology is adopted. If new technology is simply pushed with no 
acknowledgement of the need for adaptive learning, then the market may fail to take account 
of unforeseen changes in consumer behaviour. This is where the key SNM concept of a niche 
as a social experiment is so important [21,54]. Schot and Geels [53] argue that learning needs 
to occur in multiple dimensions: technical aspects and design specifications, market and user 
preferences, social and environmental effects, and regulation and government policy.  
Geels and Deuten [65] have explored the way that niches are initiated from a socio-cognitive 
perspective. They observe that niche development is a non-linear process comprised of four 
phases: local, inter-local, trans-local and global (Figure 3).  
During the local phase, the new technology is often associated with a small specific project and 
knowledge exchange takes place mainly through word of mouth. In the inter-local phase, the 
interactive space expands so that technical knowledge can be exchanged. However, the 
knowledge remains locked within the network and is rarely disclosed to external actors. It is 
not until the trans-local phase that knowledge begins to circulate more widely, for example 
through the distribution of handbooks and articles. Another characteristic of this stage is the 
emergence of intermediary actors and platforms such as  organisations of workshops and 
conferences. As niches move towards the final (global) phase, they become more stable, and 





appropriate for sharing with broader society. The transition is finally complete when the shared 
knowledge is fully universalised and the boundaries of the niche lose their relevance. 
 
Figure 3: Four phases of technological knowledge sharing [65] 
4. Method 
In this study, we used Kemp’s three conditions for a successful niche  (expectations must be 
defined and voiced, supportive social networks must be built, a learning process must occur) 
to analyse the diffusion of CSP in the US (California) and South Africa, two countries that 
stand in sharp contrast in the CSP industry. The US, a pioneer in the industry, has a long history 
of developing CSP plants. South Africa is just a beginner, despite enjoying some of the world’s 
highest levels of sunshine (calculated as direct normal irradiation, or DNI) [12]. 
Figure 4 shows how we used Kemp’s conditions to evaluate the formation of CSP niches in 
these two countries. By comparing the two, we were able to identify factors involved in the 
successful emergence of CSP. The SNM framework enabled us to make a more in-depth 
analysis of the dynamics within a CSP-promoting socio-technical niche. We could then 






Figure 4: using internal niche process for evaluating CSP niche formation; adapted from [65] 
Our evidence came from a desk-based review of academic and policy literature, including 
journals, government papers, official reports and archival records from projects’ databases. We 
investigated three CSP plants in particular, two in California and one in South Africa: the 
Ivanpah CSP at Ivanpah Dry Lake, California (392 MW); the Solar Energy Generating Systems 
(SEGS) in California’s Mojave Desert, which consists of nine CSP plants (354MW); and the 
Bokpoort CSP in South Africa’s Northern Cape Province (50 MW). 
We selected SEGS because it was the first commercial CSP project in the world [66] and the 
largest until 2014 when Ivanpah CSP overtook it, and the Bokpoort CSP because of data 
availability and its unique financing structure.  
5. Results  
The purpose of this study was to identify the key factors in the successful development of the 
CSP industry in the US and the reasons for its comparatively sluggish growth in South Africa. 





Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provide an overview of the energy market and the CSP industry in the US 
and explore the process of niche development in that country, and Sections 5.3 and 5.4 do the 
same for South Africa. 
5.1 Overview of the energy market in the US 
The US contains both competitive and vertically integrated electricity markets,  (i.e. the utilities 
use their generation, transmission and distribution systems to deliver electricity to consumers) 
[67]. In some parts of the US, however, including much of the Northeast, Midwest, Texas and 
California, the market has been restructured to allow independent power producers and non-
utility generators to trade electricity, thus encouraging competition [68].  
Solar energy (both PV and CSP) contributes to a growing proportion of the electricity 
consumed in the US. There are currently 15 active CSP plants, representing 1.7 GW (60%) of 
the 5.5 GW of total installed capacity worldwide (see Figure 5). It is estimated that the potential 
for further development of CSP in the US is 118 GW by 2030, rising perhaps to 2504GB by 
2050 [69]. 
 





SEGS I, installed in 1984, represented the first commercial exploitation of CSP in the world 
[66] and until 2014 it was the largest [69,70]. SEGS now has nine CSP plants (SEGS I–SEGS 
IX), located at three different sites. The main aim of SEGS I was to evaluate the parabolic 
trough collector’s ability to generate electricity and to assess the efficiency of the first type of 
heat element [25]. Between 1985 and 1990, LUZ Industries constructed a further series of 
commercial with an overall capacity of 354 MW in the Mojave Desert, California, US (see 
Table 1). However, when the oil price dropped in the 1990s, the US government reduced its 
support for alternative energy and there was no further construction of CSP until 2006 when 








Table 1: CSP plants implemented in the US; compiled from [16]  
Plant Name  Location  Year of 
operation  
Project type  Project Status  Technology Project 
capacity  
SEGS I California  1984 Commercial  Decommissioned Parabolic 
Trough 
13 MW 
SEGS III California  1985 Commercial  Decommissioned Parabolic 
Trough 
30 MW 
SEGS III California  1985 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
30 MW 
SEGS IV California  1989 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
30 MW 
SEGS V California  1989 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
30 MW 
SEGS VI California  1989 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
30 MW 
SEGS VII California  1989 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
30 MW 
SEGS VIII California  1989 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
80 MW 
SEGS IX California  1990 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
80 MW 




1 MW  
Nevada Solar One Nevada  2007 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
75 MW 





Colorado Integrated Solar 
Project 





Maricopa Solar Project 
(Maricopa)  
Arizona  2010 Demonstration Currently non-
Operational 
Dish  1.5 MW  




Florida  2010 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
75 MW 
Solana Arizona  2013 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
250 MW 
Tooele Army Depot Utah 2013 Commercial  Currently non-
Operational 
Dish 1.5 MW 
Genesis Solar Energy 
Project 





California  2014 Commercial  Operational Power Tower  392 MW  
Mojave Solar Project California  2014 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 
250 MW 
Crescent Dunes Solar 
Energy Project 
Nevada  2015 Commercial  Operational Power Tower  110 MW 
Stillwater GeoSolar Hybrid 
Plant 
Nevada  2015 Commercial  Operational Parabolic 
Trough 





Today, 70% of the total installed capacity of CSP in the US is located in California, including 
Ivanpah CSP which was the world’s largest plant in 2014. Figure 6 shows California’s 




Figure 6: Solar resources in California [71] 
5.2 Internal niche process 
The factors fostering the development of CSP plants in the US were investigated using Kemp’s 





5.2.1 Role of policy support in shaping expectations in the US 
The US Department of Energy (DOE) has supported the research and development of CSP 
over nearly four decades. This government sponsorship has been vital in inspiring positive and 
optimistic expectations. The time-line in Figure 7 shows the consistency of the encouragement 
that has been offered right up to the present day. The CSP demonstration projects (SEGS I to 
IX) were funded by the Department of Energy in the 1980s and became the prototype for most 
of the later CSP projects [72].  Further encouragement was provided in the 1990s when the US 
Congress introduced a 10% investment tax credit  to support the industry. When it became 
clear that this incentive was not sufficient to stimulate private investment, the investment tax 
credit was increased to 30% by the 2005 Energy Act [73].  
 
 





In 2001, the state of California introduced mandatory targets for installing renewable energy 
plants and reducing carbon emissions. This bold initiative undoubtedly reinforced expectations 
for CSP. 
In 2008 the Department of Energy introduced a loan guarantee programme to provide low-
interest finance for CSP projects that had been proven to be viable but had not yet been 
commercially exploited. This programme provided a significant opportunity for CSP niches to 
bridge the so-called ‘valley of death’, the critical period between research and development 
and the emergence of supported CSP niches in the market [72]. And in 2011 the Department 
of Energy introduced the SunShot initiative to support the development of early-stage 
technologies, offering a 75% reduction in the cost of project development [74].  
The Ivanpah CSP project was the first commercial tower CSP built in the US and is currently 
the world’s biggest operational CSP plant. It was developed by BrightSource Energy on public 
land in the Mojave Desert. The Department of Energy issued three loan guarantees totalling 
$1.6 billion in support of this $2.2 billion project [72], reducing the financial risk to a level that 
was acceptable to private investors.  
The State of California’s commitment to the development of renewable energy continues to be 
exemplary. In 2018 it increased its already ambitious targets, requiring that 50% of the state’s 
electricity should come from low-carbon-emitting sources by 2025, 60% by 2030 and 100% 
by 2045 [75]. Coupled with the Department of Energy’s generous financial guarantees and tax 
incentives, this support has enabled CSP niches to emerge in the market [76] successfully.  
5.2.2 Role of social networks in the development of CSP industry in the US 
In the 1980s the social network of CSP niches started small, with the Department of Energy 





financial risk associated with these projects was high, so it was not easy to engage stakeholders. 
However, the funding schemes which were designed to support CSP developments helped to 
overcome this initial reluctance and promote niche formation. Our case studies show that 
funding schemes in the US helped networks of actors to diversify and grow and bring in new 
actors. In the case of the Ivanpah CSP plant, for instance, the funding from the loan guarantee 
programme encouraged large companies, including Google, NGR and BrightSource, to invest 
[72]. Our analysis indicates that support from private companies through their social networks 
was critical in promoting niche stability and successful diffusion of CSP in California. 
5.2.3 Role of learning in the diffusion of CSP in the US 
Analysis of reports from the SEGS projects indicates that their sequential development between 
1984 and 1990 undoubtedly encouraged knowledge exchange. Some of the most effective 
learning happened at the ‘trans-local phase’ when SEGS demonstration projects helped to 
diffuse expertise in solving technical problems. The lessons learnt from SEGS I to VII were 
how to optimise the technical performance of CSP and what the best conditions were for 
developing CSP projects in the US, and SEGS VIII to XI showed how to increase parabolic 
trough efficiency and thereby to decrease the cost per kW of the generated electricity [25]. This 
techno-economic learning was also transferred from SEGS to other similar projects, 
encouraging the diffusion of CSP niches and eventually the broader commercialisation of the 
technology. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the CSP industry in California has now 
entered the ‘global’ phase (see Figure 3), which means that the expertise it has developed is 





5.3 Overview of the energy market in South Africa 
The South African energy market is vertically integrated and extremely centralised, with 
around 70% of its total primary energy consumption coming from coal power stations managed 
by Eskom, the national utility [77]. Eskom currently generates about 44GW of electricity, and 
this is expected to increase to 84 GW by 2025 to meet increasing domestic and industrial 
demand [78].  
The country’s reliance on coal poses the dilemma of how its energy security can be maintained 
and at the same time fulfil its commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change. Radical 
change within the entire energy system is urgently needed [5,79]. 
South Africa has some of the best solar resources in the world (see Figure 8), so there is an 
excellent opportunity for it to meet much of its energy demand using CSP power generation. 
The country has the potential to accommodate CSP projects producing a total of over 500GW 
[17]. Despite this, until very recently no CSP plants had been installed at all. The Introduction 
of Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme of 2011, which 
was designed to promote private investment in renewable energy, improved the situation a 
little. However, there are still only seven CSP power plants in the country, with an overall 
capacity of 600 MW. Six of these projects are operational and one is under development (see  
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Table 2: CSP plants implemented in South Africa [16]   
KaXu Solar 
One 
Pofadder 2015 Commercial Operational Parabolic trough 100 MW 
Bokpoort Groblershoop 2016 Commercial Operational Parabolic trough 50 MW 
Khi Solar One Upington 2016 Commercial Operational Power Tower 50 MW 
Xina Solar One Pofadder 2017 Commercial Operational Parabolic trough 100 MW 
Kathu Solar 
Park 
Kuruman 2019 Commercial Operational Parabolic trough 100 MW 
Ilanga I Kimberley ---------- Commercial Operational  Parabolic trough 100 MW 
Redstone CSP Postmasburg ---------- Commercial Under development  Power Tower 100 MW 







Figure 8: Solar resources in South Africa [80] 
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5.4 The internal niche development process in South Africa 
The reasons for the slow development of CSP plants in South Africa were investigated using 
Kemp’s SNM framework.  
5.4.1 Role of policy support in shaping expectations in South Africa  
The time-line in Figure 9 tracks the measures introduced by the South African government to 
promote renewable energy. The story began in 1998, when it published a White Paper aimed 
at reducing energy-related environmental impacts. However, renewable energy played a 
negligible role in meeting the associated targets due to high upfront costs [81]. In 2002 the 
government approved a National Integrated Resource Plan (NIRP) designed to enable South 
Africa to optimise the way the country met its electricity demands [82]. However, none of the 
NIRP policies was explicitly focused on renewable energy. A year later, a second White Paper 
was produced which for the first time explicitly promoted renewable energy technologies, 
setting the modest target that 4% of total electricity generation should be obtained from 
biomass, wind, solar and small-scale hydro projects by 2013 [83,84]. Nakumuryango and 
Inglesi-Lotz [82] argue that a more ambitious long-term renewable energy target was required. 
Nevertheless, at least to a limited extent, the 2003 paper aroused expectations for the solar 
energy industry. In 2007, these expectations were further encouraged when the government 
identified CSP as one of the most promising potential components in the South African energy 
mix [84]. However, mere rhetoric was not enough to overcome the many obstacles that 
confronted any CSP project, especially the high capital cost and the associated commercial 





The first financial incentive offered to CSP came in 2009 when the South African government 
adopted the Renewable Energy Feed-In-Tariff (REFIT) programme to support the 4% 
renewable energy target it had agreed on six years earlier. This scheme fixed a guaranteed price 
for electricity production from a wide range of renewable energy technologies (including CSP), 
thus reducing the risk and uncertainty associated with such projects by providing a stable 
revenue stream and return on investment for a fixed period [86]. 
 
 
Figure 9: Historical overview of key support schemes for renewable energy niches in South Africa; compiled 
from [81,82,87] 
However, investment in renewable energy remained at a very low level because the tariff 
offered by the REFIT scheme was too high and not competitive with electricity produced from 
coal [88]. As a result, Eskom and other commercial consumers were not able to purchase 
renewable energy at a low enough price to offset the consumers’ investment. María and Mucci 
[89] say that although some investors were interested in the REFIT scheme, they were 
discouraged by the lack of any precise administrative mechanism for receiving the 





In 2010 the government introduced the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP), the aim of which was 
to map a gradual transition toward a more sustainable and economically efficient energy policy. 
As part of the Plan, a target was set of 17.8 GW of electricity capacity to be produced from 
renewables by 2030, of which 1.2 GW was to become from CSP [90]. Specifically including 
CSP in the IRP target in this way certainly helped to raise expectations in the tiny niche that it 
occupied in the energy market. However, once again, the encouragement consisted of words 
unsupported by clear policies or resources.  
It was not until the following year that aspiration was turned into practical action. The 
ineffective REFIT scheme was replaced by the Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producer Programme (REIPPP), a public procurement facilitator aimed at enabling 
independent power producers (IPPs) to participate in competitive bids to design, develop and 
operate large-scale renewable energy plants [91]. The REIPPP provided a platform for IPPs to 
enter into power purchase agreements with Eskom [85]. Analysis of published reports indicates 
that the REIPPP successfully stimulated foreign investment in CSP, leading directly to the 
development of the seven CSP projects listed in Table 2. 
The Bokpoort plant, for example, was constructed in 2013 near Groblershoop in the North 
Cape Province [16] with an innovative financing structure: 40% of its capital investment was 
raised domestically with a debt-to-equity ratio of 71% to 29% [92]. The debt financing of the 
project was provided by various international banks, including Investec, ABSA Bank Limited 
and Old Mutual Specialised, which together contributed US$193 million [93]. Several national 
and international companies also invested in the project. The CSP technologies were imported 
from Spain and most of the technical development was carried out by international companies 





Regrettably, despite the international acclaim which the Bokpoort plant and other CSP plants 
had received, in August 2018 the South African government published a revised version of IRP 
2010. This significantly changed the target capacity allocated to renewable energy and 
excluded CSP development from the REIPPP [94]. Understandably, this caused considerable 
dismay within the CSP industry and expectations were disappointed even further when Eskom 
recently announced it was withdrawing from a CSP project to pursue solar PV [94]. At present, 
no further CSP projects are planned [16]. However, the main barrier to the further development 
of CSP projects in South Africa remains the high capital cost of these projects. Currently, the 
cost of energy from CSP plants in South Africa is still much higher than the cost of energy 
from conventional (such as coal) and renewable sources [91]. The cost of energy generated by 
CSP plants in South Africa  is five times higher than that generated from coal [91]. 
5.4.2 Role of social network in the development of CSP industry in South 
Africa 
The social network associated with the CSP niche in South Africa did not begin to function 
until 2011. It was comprised almost entirely of the Spanish companies responsible for the small 
number of projects that had begun to be developed with the introduction of the REIPPP scheme 
[95]. Initially, due to unfamiliarity with CSP technology, it was difficult to recruit local actors 
into the network. This reflected the general conservatism of the entrepreneurial culture in South 
Africa: local financial institutions and companies were reluctant to support innovative 
technologies with no record of domestic success [95]. This was why the debt financing of the 
Bokpoort project had to be provided almost entirely by various international banks [93].  
The successful development of projects like Bokpoort attracted worldwide interest and the 
social network of CSP interest in South Africa undoubtedly grew as a result. In 2015, the 





industrialists who were all committed to CSP technologies [96]. This provided an opportunity 
for interaction between a wide range of actors, including local companies, government 
organisations and global leaders in the CSP sector.  
Our analysis indicates the social network promoting the diffusion of CSP technologies in the 
country currently faces several discouragements, including a lack of interest by local 
companies, high transportation costs for importing the materials required by CSP projects, and 
the inability of local labour to match the productivity of labour provided by international 
companies [95]. 
5.4.3 Role of learning in the diffusion of CSP in South Africa  
The CSP projects in South Africa depended very heavily on international companies that had 
constructed operational CSP projects elsewhere, especially in Spain. If CSP was to take root in 
South African soil, knowledge and experience needed to be shared with local actors. However, 
the evidence is that the diffusion of such learning has been minimal. Among the obstacles that 
have been identified are lack of funds, which hinders local research and development, so there 
is little potential for CSP project designers to communicate their vision, and lack of skilled 
local labour, which hinders both the construction and the operation of CSP projects, and it is 
unclear how this skills gap can be filled [10, 93, 97]. 
5.5 Discussion  
Our research indicates that the CSP industry in California was successfully established mainly 
because of government support schemes. One of the main success factors of CSP niche 
development in the US was the strategic and consistent funding scheme. The US funding 
schemes provided both capital funding (loan guarantee) and revenue payment (Sunshot 





a significant opportunity for CSP niches at the early stage of their development, enabling them 
to emerge in the US market successfully.  
In contrast to the US, the South African support scheme only provides revenue payment. The 
REIPPP, which is the main CSP support scheme in South Africa, only provides a platform for 
CSP projects to participate in power purchase agreements that sell their electricity to the Eskom 
utility. Although this has reduced the commercial risk associated with CSP projects to some 
extent and attracted some international investment, it has not been sufficient to convince local 
financial institutions and companies to get involved. Local South African companies are also 
unable to compete with international companies in productivity and labour costs. Furthermore, 
the recent exclusion of CSP projects from the REIPPP has put the future development of CSP 
in South Africa in doubt. To reduce the financial risk of CSP projects, the South Africa 
government should restore them to the REIPPP once again. 
Eskom in 2019 announced it was withdrawing from a CSP project to pursue solar PV. In 
addition to the lack of consistent strategic policy support, the high capital costs of CSP projects 
and Eskom’s financial constraints have also played a role in the slow uptake of CSP projects 
in South Africa [94].  
South Africa has fewer  highly educated people than is the case in other parts of the world. The 
highest level of education achieved by 60% of 25 to 64 year olds in South Africa is an upper 
secondary diploma [82,97]. Under-qualified labour is likely to understand neither the expertise 
that the Spanish staff crucially brought to the project nor the usefulness of renewable energy 


























 Long history of policy support 
for CSP  
 Consistent policy support 
 Provided capital fund by low 
interest for early-stage CSP 
projects 
 Provided revenue payment 
fund for early-stage CSP 
projects  
 Provided 30% tax relief 
scheme  
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potential of CSP 
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 Lack of support and trust 
of local and national 
financial institute 
 Lack of sufficient funding 
from local companies 
 Inability of local 









 SEGS demonstration projects 
lead to frequent knowledge 
exchange and foster learning 




  Development of 




 Lack of skilled local 
labour 
 Lack of sufficient 
knowledge 
 Lack of sufficient funds 
for local R&D 
This study findings support the observations of Opazo [20] and Trieb et al. [9] that a lack of 
technological expertise is among several problems that hinder the development of innovative 
technologies such as CSP in developing countries. To solve this problem, strategic support, in 
the form of, for example, technical skills training, should be provided by CSP developers to 
facilitate interaction between local labour and international staff.  
South Africa is facing a severe developmental crisis because coal plays such an essential role 
in its economy. But large-scale adoption of CSP is a formidably daunting prospect. The 





with a strong tendency in the status quo. Which means, the process of implementing more 
renewable energy is inevitably going to be conditioned by the country’s historical pattern of 
energy generation. Considering the vertical integration of South Africa’s energy system, 
another challenge facing CSP development and the transformation of South Africa’s energy 
system is the powerful governing interest in maintaining the regime [98]. As a consequence, 
significant political and economic change is required in South Africa, if it is not to remain 
‘locked into’ existing technologies indefinitely [99].  
6. Conclusion  
This paper reviewed and compared diffusion and uptake of CSP technologies in the US and 
South Africa, with a focus on the internal niche process. Our study found that the main reason 
for the successful diffusion and adoption of CSP in California has been consistent policy 
support, including the 30% investment tax credit, the loan guarantees and the SunShot 
initiative. These policies have shaped the positive expectations for CSP projects and provided 
opportunities for CSP niches to emerge in the market. By contrast, despite some recent growth 
of CSP projects in South Africa, the development of CSP in this country has been held back 
by the lack of consistent policy support and by financial obstacles such as high capital costs 
and a lack of funding. The collapse in expectations when the exclusion of CSP projects from 
the REIPPP was announced caused considerable dismay in the CSP industry.  
Our analysis indicates that support from social network and private companies played a critical 
role in niche stability and successful diffusion of CSP in California. South Africa has struggled 
to recruit local actors into the network and engage local companies for CSP projects. South 





The sequential development of SEGS projects between 1984 and 1990 led to frequent 
knowledge exchange and this played an essential role in techno-economic learning in the CSP 
industry in the US as well as worldwide. The CSP plants that have been built in South Africa 
have depended very heavily on international companies, in particular Spanish companies and 
we found that there has been very little sharing of knowledge and experience with local actors. 
In summary, Opazo [20] and Trieb et al.[9] are surely right to observe that the establishment 
of innovative technologies, such as CSP, in developing countries, presents problems specific 
to those countries that need to be sympathetically acknowledged. Not all the experience of the 
CSP industry in the US is directly transferable to South Africa. However, some lessons can be 
learnt. One measure most likely to accelerate the uptake of CSP projects in South Africa would 
be the introduction of a capital funding scheme the US loan guarantee programme. This would 
provide an opportunity for CSP niches to emerge successfully in the market by reducing the 
commercial risk associated with CSP projects and engaging more local actors in these projects. 
The paper discussed the vital role of policy incentives, social networks and knowledge 
exchange in niche formation. The role of local public companies, to some extent, did not 
overcome ongoing challenges of development. In this regard, we feel that the impact of the 
geopolitical situation and the objective of funding provided by international funding agencies 
need more research, to enhance the understanding of the effect of the role of actors in the 
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